Netwar + Information Operations
Friend Chris Albon says, while netwar is a great concept, it runs into problems in the information war:
Arquilla is correct: a netwar-enabled military would be powerful. Swarms of small American units could be perfectly suited for dismantling irregular terrorist networks in Afghanistan and elsewhere. However, America will never have a netwar military. Why? One reason: the political cost of casualties.
I don’t really buy Wanat as an example of what’s wrong with netwar. If anything, it reveals the failings of our application of it. IE: 30 minutes is too long for close air support to arrive.
Regardless, the point Chris makes is an important one. So how do we prevent it? Don’t just inject swarm warfare doctrine into existing force structure. Rather, restructure, and vastly downsize existing forces. Basically turn the military into SOF + support. (To be fair, Arquilla does a better job talking about this in his book than he does in the FP article.) And use that structure to manage the information flows emanating from it.
This is the netwar structure that, for example, yielded amazing results in the initial invasion of Afghanistan, without suffering the dynamic Chris talks about. This was for two reasons (though neither are too palatable for a democracy):
- Special units. Partly due to the sole use of small teams of highly trained, heavily equipped, and very experienced special operators (SAD, SOCOM, etc) coupled with air power. Also due to the use of proxy local troops.
- Tightly controlled information. The secretive nature of these units means just a few stars on a wall, if that. The official casualty count was 7 in 2001 (4 in combat). I don’t know how realistic that is, but in either case, it’s a small figure.
Although, that close to 9/11 (indeed even as late as 2003) the American public supported pretty much anything in the prosecution of our enemies.
My Kingdom For Annotation
Here‘s a roundup of iPad e-reading software. Common theme? Nonexistent or really crappy annotation.
Review: Tokyo Zero
Aum Shinrikyo
On a whim, I gave this book a shot. I thoroughly enjoyed it. In contrast to the last book I reviewed, it’s a thinking fast paced book. Best of all, it raises the bar for independently published fiction.
Marc is able to synthesize a big-think technology near-future with lyrical prose. That said, Tokyo Zero isn’t about what the future looks like (in contrast to Freedom/Snow Crash etc) instead, it’s about a real and conflicted character. Think of a Tarantino character in a Gibson-esque Tokyo ruminating on viral memes and the end of times. (The book is a loose fictionalization of the Aum Shinrikyo attack.)
Also, here’s Marc’s running commentary on the book.
That mix is just a blast to read, and I’m looking forward to his next book (where I’m hoping some of the rough edges have been ironed out re: clarity) The Unhappy Planet.
Looting At Palm Before The Crash
LOL. Looks like the executive class at Palm is looting the coffers before the ride ends. A company that has consistently failed to perform… is spending huge chunks of money… to keep around professional managers (including the CFO!) that are directly responsible to that consistent failure. Hilarious.
