Netwar + Information Operations
Friend Chris Albon says, while netwar is a great concept, it runs into problems in the information war:
Arquilla is correct: a netwar-enabled military would be powerful. Swarms of small American units could be perfectly suited for dismantling irregular terrorist networks in Afghanistan and elsewhere. However, America will never have a netwar military. Why? One reason: the political cost of casualties.
I don’t really buy Wanat as an example of what’s wrong with netwar. If anything, it reveals the failings of our application of it. IE: 30 minutes is too long for close air support to arrive.
Regardless, the point Chris makes is an important one. So how do we prevent it? Don’t just inject swarm warfare doctrine into existing force structure. Rather, restructure, and vastly downsize existing forces. Basically turn the military into SOF + support. (To be fair, Arquilla does a better job talking about this in his book than he does in the FP article.) And use that structure to manage the information flows emanating from it.
This is the netwar structure that, for example, yielded amazing results in the initial invasion of Afghanistan, without suffering the dynamic Chris talks about. This was for two reasons (though neither are too palatable for a democracy):
- Special units. Partly due to the sole use of small teams of highly trained, heavily equipped, and very experienced special operators (SAD, SOCOM, etc) coupled with air power. Also due to the use of proxy local troops.
- Tightly controlled information. The secretive nature of these units means just a few stars on a wall, if that. The official casualty count was 7 in 2001 (4 in combat). I don’t know how realistic that is, but in either case, it’s a small figure.
Although, that close to 9/11 (indeed even as late as 2003) the American public supported pretty much anything in the prosecution of our enemies.
-Shlok
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