Gentile’s Peeking Behind The Surge IO
I like Col. Gentile, because he shakes up the state of the COIN school of thought. He wants to continue the conversation, the dialectic engine, instead of letting it ossify and die. (Far too many seem to think “we got it.”)
Interesting quote:
And, after all was said and done, _On Point II_ concludes that across the board for the first eighteen months in Iraq, the American army (even without a formal doctrine in counterinsurgency and nation-building operations) quickly made the transition, and by the end of 2003 was conducting “best practices” in these types of operations.
This is not a conclusion that fits the standard narrative put forward by the matrix. But, as _On Point II_ makes clear, the U.S. Army actually adapted quickly and effectively to conditions in Iraq in 2003 and 2004.
Essentially, he wants to harness the lessons learned from that transition and institutionalize them. That’s critical to adapting the legacy system that is the U.S. military to a new future. Not sure how much traction he’s getting.
That is mostly a function of his recognition that the Surge was a successful information operation rather than some brilliant new approach.
This will be a tough pill to swallow, because it only recognizes Patraeus and his Jedis as simply good management and good sales. They reinforced positive feedback loops being generated farther down the hierarchy while amping it up in the public sphere.
-Shlok
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